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Diagonal Convergences:  Genetic Testing, Governance, and Globalisation 
Introduction: 
The actual and sometimes quite unexpected uses to which individuals put new 
technologies can undermine social norms. Governments therefore often try to control 
access to new technologies. Beyond that, the notion of Converging Technologies (CT) 
stands for government programmes that not only monitor and regulate a new 
technology but plan and steer the convergence of emerging technologies and their 
future potential uses. In the early 2000s the U.S. and Europe set up government 
programmes to induce and configure the convergence of the nano-, bio-, information- 
and cognitive sciences (NIBC) into technologies that will alter humanity’s ways of 
being. CT is a form of meta-level governance that aims to control not only individual 
technological developments but also the ways in which scientific and technical 
innovations might intersect and cause social and economic change. This paper treats 
CT as an especially ambitious and precarious instance of governance because it aims 
to predetermine future science, future technologies, their intersections and resulting 
societal changes. Drawing on examples of a convergence that is well underway, I aim 
to demonstrate some of the problems of such prospective policy-making and argue 
that it draws on an understanding of the power and means of national governments 
that is already technologically overcome. National or local CT policies represent what 
Foucault called governmentality, an overreliance on manageability, regarding the 
formation of new platforms for decision-making that is happening alongside and 
irrespective of such government programmes. This situation demands new ways of 
policy-making of certain social values are to be protected.  
This chapter begins with two critical approaches toward policy-making and its 
philosophical validation. One is by Alfred Nordmann, who, after years of studying CT 
programmes, reflected on the role of academics in such science and technology 
governance. I refer especially to two of his criticisms in his article Knots and Strands: 
An Argument for Productive Disillusionment from 2007. The first concerns the 
coalition of academic research and policy-making, the second the universality of 
claims inherent in the resulting policies which themselves are markedly culturally 
distinct. Following on from this second point, I step back from the CT controversy 
and defer to a feminist philosopher, Susan Sherwin. In No Longer Patient, published 
in 1992, she proposes to overcome the divide between normative universalist claims 
and empirical cultural perspectivism through analysis of the power relations and 
participatory practices underlying the ethical judgments in policy-making. Reflecting 
on the epistemic status of EU or USA CT policies crucial for their assessment seems 
the idea of possible political governance under conditions where technological 
convergences with great perceived potential and uncertainty go global. In order to 
support this point with evidence, I then discuss two topical case studies dealing with 
attempts to control technology and its uses, both being about access to genetic tests; 
direct to consumer genetic tests sold online, and non-invasive prenatal genetic tests 
offered in the same way. Within a decade genetics has moved from being firmly in 
the hands of academic and state institutions.  The convergence of information 
technologies and global marketing practices has taken it out of that controlled sphere. 
Converging Technology projects have partly reckoned with the change toward open 
access to genetic tests, but authorities have not found ways of restricting them and 
present only weak arguments why they ought to do so. The genetic case studies 
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illustrate four points: a) a systematic misrepresentations of consumers’ knowledge 
and interests; b) a focus on the technologies instead of the cultural contexts of their 
application, which distorts the perception of ethical problems and prevents viable 
political responses to social concerns; c) the cultural specificity of ethical imperatives 
with which new technologies are examined; and  d) that academics pursue an agenda 
of their own in their cooperations with regulators on genetic testing. The convergence 
of genetics, global information technologies and market infrastructures has created an 
environment in which genetic tests can no longer be controlled through the mediation 
of experts and prohibitions. Following Sherwin’s suggestion about examining power 
relations, I consider the present debate about direct-to-consumer genetic tests to be 
about privileges of power and knowledge in the guise of stewardship and patronage 
over citizens’ DNA-derived information. This has often been framed by experts as 
concern with quality management in genetic testing. Yet, the quality of the tests could 
and possibly should be safeguarded generally through international standards and 
certificates. Local quality control is impossible to implement in an open global 
market. In the case of non-invasive prenatal genetic tests for sex selection, the conflict 
between consumers interests and the long-term common good needs to be addressed 
at source, following the arguments pursued by Sherwin. Policy-making has to tackle 
the cultural values and practices that make it a rational choice for many to prefer a 
male infant to a girl child. That would not only prevent sex-selective use of genetics 
but address sex-discrimination in the relevant cultures on a much wider scale and 
enhance the welfare of the whole community, girls and women included.  
Two Philosophical Approaches  
Nordmann, who is one of the leading experts on the NIBC convergence in Europe and 
the U.S., has published both policy reports and academic critiques of the involvement 
of academics in the governance of science and technology. In Knots and Strands: An 
argument for Productive Disillusionment (2007), a paper that reflects his experience 
in government funded research projects for policies to manage convergence and its 
ecological, societal and ethical effects, he distinguishes two different approaches to 
CT. One justifies the direct steering of converging technologies with future national 
interests for economic prosperity. The other is explicitly motivated by ethical issues 
and aims to prevent societal risks of convergence beyond the risks that each science 
and technology alone is seen to carry. Nordmann aligns the first approach with the 
attitude taken in U.S. programmes on CT, where directing the convergence of Nano-, 
Bio-, Information- and Cognitive (NBIC) sciences and technologies is an important 
means to secure future economic revenue from technological advances. In contrast, in 
Europe:  
“we find ourselves in a situation where various enabling technologies and many 
pressing societal issues (global warming, obesity, water and energy supply, etc.) 
challenge us to institute converging technologies as a means of gearing emerging 
capabilities towards common goals.” (2007, 219)  
The common goals are ethical and concern human welfare and social cohesion and 
inclusion. 
“This comparison of U.S. and European definitions of ‘converging technologies’ 
leaves us in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, it speaks very clearly to 
different cultural perspectives and thus to a kind of parochialism on both sides. On the 
other hand, neither perspective views itself as parochial but claims universality.” 
(ibid., 220)  
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The passages above summarize critically the political attitudes and perspectives in the 
programmes on NIBC to which Nordmann has directly contributed. He authored the 
European Commission Research Report Converging Technologies – Shaping the 
Future of European Societies (Nordmann, 2004), which sets out the challenges arising 
from the transformative potential of Converging Technology (CT). This report begins 
with defining four problems of the NIBC convergence arising from the tension 
between potential economic and social benefits and “threats to culture and tradition, 
to human integrity and autonomy, perhaps to political and economic stability” (ibid., 
ii). The transformative potential of CT is described not in the language of profits but, 
rather, of an ethics of the human species. His four characteristics are: (a) 
Embeddedness: the ubiquity of artificial environments that may transform human 
self-understanding; (b) Unlimited reach: the potential that everything can be 
transformed into computable information and that everything molecular can be 
controlled. An attitude of technological quick-fix may come to reign supreme; (c) 
Engineering the mind and the body: this entails the proposal that CT policies must 
have a humanitarian bias; (d) Specificity: the conflict between the potential of 
personalized medicines and case-specific technology solutions, which may lead to 
social problems (Nordmann 2004, page 3). These characteristics mirror the risk 
aspects that were ascribed to genetics since the 1970s, strongly emphasizing concerns 
about injustice and the instrumentalization of human life. The European approach to 
CT stresses the need for ethical governance. The U.S. mode pronounces economic 
advance as justification for policy-making. Nordmann refers to Sheila Jasanoff’s 
distinction between hubris and humility in her paper on cultures of modernity in the 
U.S and Europe. She identifies “hubris in attempts to politically manage potential 
resistance (Jasanoff, 2002). The opposing attitude of humility looks to ethics … in 
order to buy time for reflection and to mobilize the cultural resources that will allow 
for local adaptations of technological agendas and avoidance of uniform global 
diffusion“ (Nordmann, 2007: 221). I would prefer to leave it an open question as to 
whether this U.S.-Europe difference is a general characteristic, or simply occasional 
PERHAPS “CONTINGENT” IS BETTER THAN “OCCASIONAL”?  and possibly 
in part rhetorical and due to cultural codes of legitimacy for political governance. 
These value-laden characterizations cannot be readily applied to the policies 
concerning genetic testing. Humility as ethical attitude implies deference to 
established orders and values, and the case studies below show that with regard to 
direct-to-consumer genetic testing such ethical aspects are important motivators in 
current U.S. science and technology policy.  
Following his involvement in the European NIBCT research programme, Nordmann 
reflects on the contribution of academics to policy-making. Through dedicated 
research funding, growing impact agendas and genuine overlap of interests, 
philosophers and social scientists are drawn into technology assessment and science 
governance. Academic experts are often called upon when government bodies, and 
research or ethics institutions consider policies on new sciences and technologies. In 
the publication of their research findings, and more directly in reports to policy 
committees bioethicists, social scientists and philosophers participate in the 
ideological and conceptual framings of the issues and thus share responsibility for the 
policies that emerge. Nordmann describes the entanglement of academics in framing 
the issues as a “deadly embrace” into normative political agendas, an issue of being 
drawn into set definitions of ethical problems which can undermine academic rigour 
and independence frequently discussed in bioethics in recent years (Eckenwiler and 
Cohn, 2009). He suggests that academics engage in the “disentangling” of normative, 
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sociological and ontological concepts as an analytic method to keep a self-critical 
distance from the conceptual and normative alliances formed in the policy 
development process (Nordmann, 2007: 226-227). Yet he remains vague about how 
to do this in practice. The gist is a stepwise self-reflexive disentanglement of the 
concepts tied together in the technology assessment discourses and their normative 
agenda-setting. The tension between culturally specific normativities in the European 
style CT programme and its inherent claim to universality when setting out ideas of 
human nature also troubles him. He does, however, not suggest an approach with 
which STS and bioethics might address this problem.   
The tension between universalist claims and socio-cultural parochialism is highly 
relevant for the credibility and potential success of nationally- or geo-politically- 
focussed CT programmes. Feminist philosophers examining medical and bio-
technologies in particular have analysed the problem of universalism, pluralism and 
cultural diversity in the context of ethical issues that are gender-specific. One such 
author among others is Susan Sherwin. In No Longer Patient (Sherwin, 1992), she 
discusses the conflict between the universalism inherent in moral claims and the fact 
of culturally diverse perceptions of what is right and wrong. She proposes to look not 
at the values and norms that are contested, but rather at the procedures and power 
structures in force in how policies are made and decisions taken. Discussing abortion 
and female genital mutilation, Sherwin defends a feminist moral relativism that 
examines the participation procedures that carry an established moral system. The 
power- and interpersonal relations of those engaged and subjected to normative 
expectations provide the clues about its fairness, “it is necessary to consider how the 
system evolved, whose interests are served by it, and, most importantly, whose 
interests are sacrificed to it” (Sherwin, 1992: 71). She stresses the need for both 
tolerance and the contextualisation of norms and practices on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, a strong and powerful critique of oppression, wherever it occurs, without 
false respect for cultural or national boundaries characterize her practical ethics (ibid., 
73).  
Sherwin argues that analysis of power relations and participatory practices opens up a 
space for critique beyond the verdict of Western moral imperialism. I will refer to this 
method when discussing the credibility and efficacy of current policies to control 
access to genetic testing. The social conditions following this convergence allow 
global citizens forms of self-determination that they seem to appreciate and which 
defy previous modes of regulatory prohibition and elitist restrictions of access to 
technology. The two case studies, direct-to-consumer genetic testing and its 
application in non-invasive prenatal testing for sex selection, are not commonly 
discussed under the label of convergence. Yet both are products of the recent manifest 
convergence of genetics with information technologies and globalisation. Fast and 
cheap genetic testing methods, global knowledge exchange and world-wide operating 
markets for goods and services create open access markets. Disputes about these new 
developments characterize the regulatory agenda for life sciences under labels such as 
do-it-yourself biology and open markets for drugs and tests. Government agencies, 
and the medical professions especially, aim to reign in the public use of genetics. 
Nordmann’s distinction between nationalist economic and generalist humanitarian 
missions of CT programmes, and Sherwin’s method of judging ethical regimes in 
terms of their participatory or oppressive qualities help me to evaluate the debates 
about open access and direct-to-consumer genetic testing. 
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The presentation of the case studies highlights two important aspects regarding the 
governability of convergence: the presupposed relationship between governments and 
their experts toward the public, and the empowerment for individual citizens that 
poses new opportunities and new challenges for the social impact of genetics.  
‘Genetic Exceptionalism’ or the Private Management of Personal Data  
Genetics has been the most extensively covered topic in bioethics because it was 
perceived as dangerous in many ethical and political dimensions, concerning human 
nature and human rights, concerns which reappear in the CT Report referenced above. 
Studies in and on genetics have been very well funded and consequently bioethics 
grew into an expert discipline that would inform policies and public attitudes. The 
multi-disciplinary bioethics field that studies the ethical, social and legal aspects of 
genetics evolved into a major expert sub-discipline alongside the sciences that make 
sense of DNA and what genetic tests may indicate about a persons biological make-
up. Genethics (Suzuki and Knudtson, 1989), as this field became called, investigates 
the the regulations for genetics needed to protect individual rights and the social 
fabric at large. Important for my argument is that among scientists, regulators and the 
bioethics disciplines, genetics was perceived as so powerful that the control of its 
societal effects became a major political and societal issue. National and transnational 
legislations and moratoria are in place to restrict the use of genetic data1, and 
informed consent to testing was made a necessary prerequisite for many tests. Genes 
were seen as providing conclusive and unchanging information about a person’s 
phenotype, heath and future health, personality traits, race and ancestry, biological 
relatedness, and more.  
Around the year 2000 this simplistic image of genetics, and with it the exceptional 
status of DNA test findings, began to disintegrate. The Human Genome Project found 
that humans have far less ‘genes’ than their complex biology seemed to require. It had 
to be concluded that many biological properties are not simply written in the genes 
and that DNA tests do not tell us everything about biological traits. Consequently, 
genetics has matured from a position of imagined omnipotence to an increasingly 
refined set of specific applications. Most tests available today only provide 
approximate information about health risks or other traits. The STS and bioethics 
literature has changed along with genetics and adopts a more observant attitude to 
new knowledge and testing practices and how they influence specific social 
configurations of identity and self (Petersen, 2006).  
However, that people might use genetics in the same way as other tests and on their 
own account was not much considered. The genetics-information technology-
globalisation (GIG) convergence that occurred was not well anticipated. The literature 
discusses the loss of the exceptionalist status of genetics and whether previously 
established prohibitions ought to be upheld. An example is price-setting in health 
insurance. Moratoria that prohibit the use of genetics for health insurance risk 
calculation are in force in Europe, the U.S., and other locations. However, if genetic 
information is only somewhat indicative of a person’s health, these moratoria may be 
superfluous. Richard Ashcroft and Soren Holm exchanged arguments on this question 
in the British Medical Journal (Ashcroft, 2007; Holm, 2007). Holm argues that if 
genetic tests are of a predictive quality similar to that of family history of disease, 
which insurers can use, why should they then not use genetic information? The 
moratorium is in place in Europe until 2017. The convergence that changes access 
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and management of DNA tests may bypass the efficacy of such control strategies by 
then.  
While not much may be written in the genes directly, global markets and global 
communication networks enable new ways of doing things with genetic tests that 
individual consumers are interested in, such as health status, bio-geographical origin, 
or race (Hauskeller et al., 2013). Members of the public buy genetic tests although 
regulators and experts recommend that genetics should be conducted with close 
supervision by scientific and medical authorities. There is a widening opposition 
between regulatory agencies and the private businesses and their customers’ wish for 
self-management. The GIG-convergence troubles established knowledge and power 
relations in which layindividuals were fully dependent on experts and regulators.  
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing (DTCGT): A regulatory conundrum 
The industry offering DTCGT sells intelligence about biological relations, race, bio-
geographic origins, health risks and personality traits to private customers. Tests can 
be bought easily and at a low cost. In November 2013 a paternity test cost £130 in the 
British pharmacy chain Boots, and a health and ancestry test from 23andMe was £62. 
The transition of genetics from an expert-led to a lay-access technology has caused 
regulatory concern, not least because this shift undermines established safeguards 
against discriminatory uses.  
Below I summarize briefly first the regulatory struggles to limit DTCGT and the 
related academic debates. I separate regulatory and academic discourses, although 
academics are involved in policy processes, in order to point out their alignment in 
content. The ethical and social science debates single out the same points that are 
raised in regulatory papers. This underlines Nordmann’s notion of a non-obvious 
entanglement. In the direction of Sherwin’s critique, this alignment signposts that 
expertise and power are closely entwined when the authority over new science and 
technology is at stake. Both DTCGT and prenatal sex-selection are instances of a 
growing tension, if not in fact directly opposing interests between expert and 
government bodies on one side and consumers on the other. 
For over 30 years it was generally accepted that genetics needs to be regulated for the 
good of the public. For many, DTCGT only increases this need and creates new 
ethical problems (Wasson et al., 2005; Berg and Fryer-Edwards, 2008). Calls for 
regulation have been published by government bodies and ethics committees in 
Australia, the USA, European and Asian countries. The National Institute of Health 
(NIH) Task Force on Genetic Testing considered regulation as early as 19982 and 
published several recommendations in recent years. In 2009, the UK Human Genetics 
Commission (HGC) issued a ‘Framework of Principles for direct-to-consumer 
Genetic Testing’ (‘Principles’) which outlines criteria for acceptable practices with 
respect to informed consent, marketing, risk communication, availability of 
counselling, and data protection.3 The Australian National Health and Medical 
Research Council’s report for health professionals acknowledges problems with 
DTCGT, noting that marketing as such cannot be banned.4 The shared assumption is 
that public users cannot make good sense of these tests and will burden health 
services with unnecessary expert visits. In the U.S. regulators have begun to proceed 
against testing companies. In March 2011, the advisory committee on molecular and 
clinical genetics of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enforced NIH 
recommendations from 2000 concerning the adverting of DTCGT products as non-
diagnostic.5 This intervention followed the prohibition of some private genetic testing 
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companies operating in California in 2009 and the FDA’s inquiry into US-based 
companies in summer 2010.  
The academic debate emphasizes the lack of quality of the privately offered tests and 
consumers’ ability to make sense of the findings. Also, wider use may adversely 
affect health services and wider society (Hall and Gartner, 2009). Other concerns 
include effects on the medical professions and their expertise requirements (Annes et 
al., 2010; Edelman, 2009), because of lack of professional training in genetics. Ethics 
committees and academics suggest new data protection and privacy laws (Javitt et al., 
2004; Hogarth et al., 2008; Kaye, 2008) as well as comprehensive informed consent 
regulations (Bunnik et al., 2012). Genetics has put notions of informed consent under 
strain in several ways, not least because genes are shared among relatives (Corrigan, 
2003; Hauskeller, 2004; Lunshof et al., 2008; Mascalzoni et al., 2008). Genetic and 
biobank research projects, such as the UK Biobank or the Iceland National Human 
Genome Project, operate with open unspecific consent to data use (Palsson and 
Rabinow, 1999) in order to  reduce cost and widen the usability of collected 
information and body materials. However, open consent to public or private biobank 
enterprises implies that the participating public understands what goes on and must 
trust these institutions with their personal data. I consider it self-contradictory to 
invite the public to donate to biobanks with open consent, yet not trust its members to 
be able to comprehend the vagueness of DTCGT tests and use them sensibly. The 
academic critique of DTCGT concentrates on common complex disease and ancestry 
testing, and how difficult it is to understand and contextualize the information. 
Regulation is needed to prevent social harm (Kolor et al., 2009; Messner, 2011).6  
The academic and regulatory literature on DTCGT portrays the consumer as emotion-
ridden and without sufficient scientific understanding. This person is a potential threat 
to society because she will respond unreasonably and cause increases in the cost of 
health care and social services. Following previous requests for stricter DTCGT 
marketing strategies, the FDA issued an enforcement action against 23andMe in 
November 2013, stating that the “FDA is concerned about the public health 
consequences of inaccurate results from the PGS device; the main purpose of 
compliance with FDA’s regulatory requirements is to ensure that the tests work.” and 
“23andMe must immediately discontinue marketing the PGS until such time as it 
receives FDA marketing authorization for the device.” Among its motives to act, the 
FDA states that “[t]he risk of serious injury or death is known to be high when 
patients are either non-compliant or not properly dosed; combined with the risk that a 
direct-to consumer test result may be used by a patient to self-manage, serious 
concerns are raised if test results are not adequately understood by patients or if 
incorrect test results are reported.”7 This restriction is still in place in January 2014. 
Note, though, this is not a general restriction to selling private genetic tests but 
specific to a piece of equipment and health advertising. The FDA’s intervention for 
the public good encountered hostile public response, especially on community forums 
and internet news sites. Consumers mostly defended 23andMe, criticizing the FDA as 
over-regulating and recently experts have expressed a similar view (Green and 
Farahany, 2014). 
Citizens ask why they should be prevented from buying genetics tests if they want 
them, and why they need to entrust the management of their genetic data should rest 
in the hands of experts and large organisations. Given that the consumption of many 
harmful products burdens health care systems, yet this situation is largely unregulated 
with regards to  adult buyers, it seems that the argument for the exceptional harm 
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allegedly deriving from DTCGT needs to be actively made rather than simply 
assumed on the basis of previous and now largely discarded beliefs in the determining 
power of DNA. Life-style is increasingly seen as a major causal factor for common 
diseases and medical public health experts and government institutions increasingly 
demand that individuals self-govern with a view to maintaining their health. Experts 
and institutions offer life-style guidance, issue food labels, devise smoking bans, set 
age restrictions on sales of alcohol, and promote sports in schools, in order to 
influence citizens’ behaviours. The DTCGT market could be seen as an instrument to 
increase health awareness and autonomy in life style choices, if the tests possess 
decent validity, and ideally are clinically useful. Of course, this ability to encourage 
healthy life styles depends on the common public understanding of genetics to enable 
the sensible use of DTCGT results. Initial studies on the uses of DTCGT and its 
effects on the clinic indicate that this might be assumed (Giovanni et al., 2010). 
DTCGT buyers are on the whole aware of the complexity of genetic knowledge and 
that results are indicative not predictive for each individual testee (Hall et al., 2010b). 
Larger studies about consumer behaviour and professional experience with genetic 
information are underway.  
The DTCGT debates in North-America, Australia and European countries are similar 
in their arguments concerning risks for public health, the deficit of scientific 
understanding among consumers and the lack of scientific quality of the tests on offer. 
This uniformity is remarkable given the different societal effects DTCGT has in the 
diverse provisions of health care and the cultural differences in the public and 
political attitudes towards genetics in these countries. Yet regulators and academics 
predominantly agree that public access to genetic tests ought to be tightly supervised. 
I am concerned that this grand agreement arises from a potential in DTCGT rarely 
mentioned in the discourses above, namely that it threatens the authority of science, 
the medical professions, and bioethicists’ special expertise. Some critics of bioethics 
as a profession (De Vries et al., 2009; Evans, 2012) have pointed out the dilemma 
inherent in the professionalization and status of ethicists as specialists, that the 
decrease in demand for their services puts at risk individual careers and expert 
disciplines. The same can be assumed for genetic counsellors and medical expert 
professions in the field. The enabling potential of quality-assured DTCGT as a self-
determined health strategy may not be borne out because of diverse sets of conflicts 
challenging the multi-disciplinary panels that advise regulatory organisations, as 
Nordmann points out with respect to the NIBC convergence (Nordmann, 2007).   
The central first level problem is that given the GIG convergence prohibitive 
regulation may save time but is not a long term method of containment. National 
laws, moratoria or weak instruments such as the ‘Principles’, suggesting standards for 
testing, cannot suppress the use of a product marketed worldwide via the internet if 
consumers are motivated to have it (Hogarth et al., 2008). Neither the legislation nor 
the policing institution are in place to prevent online marketing, sale and trade. I 
suggest elsewhere that international product standards and certification procedures are 
the only reliable means of securing test quality (Hauskeller, 2011). International 
quality certificates would not control all products available but would offer consumers 
the choice of investing in a high quality product, a choice currently unavailable.  
Standards can only address test quality and validity, not problems that arise from the 
diversity between cultural scenarios and value systems within which the same genetic 
test can take on very different roles and meanings. This problem is best illustrated 
with the case of non-invasive prenatal genetic testing and especially its use for sex-
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determination. This example will also highlight how the authorities’ neglect of 
moving towards a system of global technocratic quality assurance is in the way of a 
sensible global debate about the culturally dependent and diverse effects of DTCGT. 
Non-invasive prenatal Diagnosis (NIPD) 
NIPD is a special case of DTCGT because its utility and uses depend on cultural 
contexts and values. In that it is a challenge for the foresight expectations of CT 
programmes and agendas which assume that technology benefits can be nationally 
defined and at the same time subjected to universal ethical stewardship.  
DNA from the embryo/foetus circulates freely in the pregnant woman’s blood during 
pregnancy. Technologies to identify the embryo’s or foetal DNA in a maternal blood 
sample, and to ascertain the genetic condition of the embryo or foetus on that basis, 
have been under development since 1997. The medical and ethical advantage  is that 
the method is non-invasive and can be used early (from week 6) in pregnancy. Many 
Western medical and public health communities see NIPD as highly desirable because 
it avoids the medical risks and ethical problems of late abortions carried by the 
current invasive techniques to extract foetal DNA. In several countries advanced 
stages of clinical trials with NIPD are under way and the technology is envisaged as a 
future routine element in antenatal care and national screening programmes.8 There is 
a fast growing literature on the topic from which I will cite a selection to set the scene 
for the reflection on the cross-cultural effects of converging technologies and the 
resulting problems for science and technology policy-making.  
The push to introduce NIPD into clinical routines (Chitty et al., 2008; de Jong et al., 
2009) has been criticized by medical ethicists (Newson, 2008) who emphasize 
problems with informed consent (Wright and Chitty, 2009; Hall et al., 2010a) and the 
threat it poses to the principle of reproductive autonomy. In an exchange in Nature 
Reviews Genetics Schmitz, Netzer, and Henn defend parental autonomy, emphasizing 
that routine NIPFD would undermine the right not to know (Schmitz et al., 2009). 
Against this view Ravitsky argues prospective parents ought to be encouraged to have 
NIPD as early as possible (Ravitsky, 2009). Others have argued that NIPD is yet 
another step toward the commodification of pregnancy and the genetic normalisation 
of children (Skotko, 2009). NIPD offers, like other prenatal genetic testing, no 
therapeutic choices except continuation or termination of the pregnancy. It provides 
information on the genetics of the embryo/foetus only, other anomalies remain 
undetected. Kelly and Farrimond present findings from a small-scale study on public 
perceptions of NIPD in the UK, with participants generally responding positively but 
expressing worries about the potential for eugenic discrimination of disability. The 
participants favoured limiting NIPD to severe disorders (Farrimond and Kelly, 2011) 
and ask that sustainable regimes of counselling and care are put in place (Kelly and 
Farrimond, 2011).  
The discussion I sketched above about the advantages and problems of NIPD reflects 
the concerns raised in countries where the sex of a child as such is generally not seen 
as an important aspect of its desirability. The problems and the general ethical and 
political picture changes dramatically when NIPD is discussed in cultural contexts in 
which raising a male child is deemed much more preferable than raising a female 
child. The existing literature on NIPD mentions sex-determination of the embryo and 
sex-selection (Wright and Chitty, 2009; King, 2011; Daar, 2011) and suggests 
restricting sex-selection to medical conditions such as sex-linked diseases. Yet it is 
recognized that there is no clear boundary which can be drawn in clinical practice 
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between sex-selection for foetal medical health and family acceptance. The wish for a 
‘balanced family’, denoting a family consisting of mother, father, a boy and a girl, 
had alarmed ethicists when reproductive technologies became applied in the U.S. for 
sex-selection of pre-implantation embryos and in selective abortions. If this choice for 
a balanced family is socio-politically acceptable and part of clinical regimes, how can 
doctors single out the wish to have a son first? Cultural and political biases that 
disadvantage those who raise girls have motivated the use of pre-pregnancy sperm 
selection, sex-selective abortion and have lead to child murder or abandonment in 
many countries as has been documented since the 1980s (George, 2006). Global 
cross-cultural migration disperses the different cultural ideals of a desirable child 
across regulatory realms and challenges the cultural homogeneity implicitly assumed 
in the values that recommend NIPD in the UK or U.S. as ethically and medically 
beneficial. In 2012 and 2013 the UK revisited the rules under which sex-selection and 
abortion are practiced following reports that some doctors abort female foetuses on 
request. Grounds to prosecute these doctors could not be established. Yet, during the 
debate the issue was raised as to whether the detrimental effects of the birth of a 
female child to the mother’s wellbeing and health ought to be considered in clinical 
decision–making about an abortion request in the UK. There are no firm boundaries 
for medical indications, and under conditions of multi-cultural societies, ethical 
advice and ideals that built on relative value homogeneity within particular countries 
are simply inadequate. 
The availability of NIPD not only through medical services but also on DTCGT 
markets means that its effects on practices of sex-selection cannot be tightly 
controlled. This worries authorities in India and China, for example, where the sex 
ratio of births is becoming skewed towards male birth, increasingly causing negative 
effects on social life. It is not possible to prevent the use of technologies that are 
commonly used in some countries in other countries, or to treat pregnant women 
differently within one country based on the presumed cultural values of their country 
of origin or ancestry. The convergence of technologies, information exchanges and 
multicultural society and life-styles mean that laws and best medical practice guides 
cannot stop the uptake of NIPD at home. There are also no defensible grounds from 
which a subsequent demand for an abortion, which we may assume to be in the 
rational best interest of the pregnant woman, cannot be denied or simply disregarded. 
Cultural contexts in which it is rational to assume that sex-selection is a long-term 
social problem can only counter sex-selection through cultural re-evaluations and 
political interventions that change the status of girls and women. The arguments 
Susan Sherwin provides for considering the cultural aspects of abortion and female 
genital mutilation can readily be applied to prenatal sex-selection.  
Converging Technologies, Normativity and Socio-Cultural Differences 
The convergences that transformed genetics from an expert-only high-risk science to 
a wide-ranging set of open access technologies can inform science and technology 
policies in at least two ways. First, the perceived nature of a science or  technology 
can alter quickly and is difficult to predict. Secondly, in liberal-democratic societies 
the scope for effective national or local government control over knowledge and 
technologies is decreasing – its time may be over for all knowledge and technologies 
that can be distributed globally using the new media. 
The stark tension between government support for new science and business ventures 
on the one hand and protective sentiments toward the social status quo in which 
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authorities govern technologies on the other hand is borne out in the DTCGT debates. 
Policy makers adopt a paternalist attitude towards the public and portray an attitude of 
‘humility’ concerning current socio-cultural values when demanding control over 
DTCGT for the good of humanity. The major problem for regulators and authorities is 
the lack of control over the quality of the tests and over the uses people make of them. 
Both render unpredictable the wider social effects, not least for the authority of 
medicine and science itself.  
The meaning of DTCGT and NIPD depends on individual, social and political 
contexts. Some of the tensions over NIPD do not arise from the genetic eugenic 
technology as such but is grounded in misogynist socio-political conditions. Asking 
along with Sherwin who establishes these cultural rules and who benefits from them, 
as feminists in India and China have done, leads to insight into oppressive gender 
orders that are unjustified and directly harmful to women and subsequently the whole 
of society.Yet for each woman considered individually, having a female child may  
involve long-term damage to her, her family, her marriage, and her physical and 
mental health. Policies that try to manuevre through a morass of radically opposed 
public and individual interests are unsustainable. Sex-discriminatory practices can 
only be addressed by changes to the socio-cultural fabric of values and the interests 
that sustain them.  
Drawing on recent social science studies, I have tried to disentangle the web of 
values, concepts and presuppositions in the DTCGT debate. Nordmann calls the 
mutual admiration of the scientific and STS communities a potentially ‘deadly 
embrace’(Nordmann, 2007: 226). I want to apply this metaphor for bioethics and STS 
on convergence more generally. Geneticists, counsellors and many bioethicists owe 
their livelihood to their contribution to the governance of genetics, so that collusion 
might seem a life-saver – at least for the time being. Yet, in this ‘deadly embrace’ 
they are credited with responsibility for the effects of the resulting practices of 
governance, and negative social outcomes may undermine the critical function of 
academia in the medium term. Sherwin proposes that policies need to be assessed 
critically concerning the power structures that inform and perpetuate themselves 
within them. Social practices that in effect disregard or oppress parts of a society, be 
that women or migrants from diverse cultural backgrounds, are morally and ethically 
unjustifiable. The GIG convergence needs to be reflected upon regarding 
globalisation in terms of both markets and cultural heterogeneity.  
Globally responsible means of ethical and social governance may be needed. The 
development of international product standards can be an important step towards 
responsible online markets for genetic tests. Yet another step has to be taken 
alongside it. We need to develop new representational formats in which cultural 
diversity can be represented in the interests of the communities affected by the way in 
which any new technology may be introduced or governed. Currently governments 
and experts configure their relationship toward the public as if that public was 
homogenous and needed showing the way. Instead of enhancing the critical ability to 
manage scientific knowledge and technologies autonomously, restriction policies 
undermine the potential for individuals to engage with them intelligently. The 
perpetuation of the discrimination of girls and women through short-term solutions to 
pre- or post-natal sex-selection, such as restricting access or criminalisation,  
oppresses pregnant women and should alert democratic governments and ethicists to 
the urgency with which they need to realize the true challenges posed by scientific 
and technological convergence. It may be possible to slow down such developments 
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but black markets cannot be halted as long as individual consumers have strong 
motives to use the tests.  
Diagonal convergence stands for the ways in which there is no homogenous referent 
for moral values, ethical practice and social and economic interests in ongoing 
convergence phenomena that can be defined meaningfully. Responsible governance 
and regulation need transnational integration in order to address the issues of product 
safety, forms of use, and short- and long-term societal effects locally and globally.     
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